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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                            __________                       
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
     Defendant-appellant, Zulmes Orozco challenges the 
constitutionality of the Drug-Free School Zones Act, 21 U.S. C. § 
845(a).  Orozco was convicted of distributing 1080 grams of 
cocaine within one thousand feet of a school.  He argues on 
appeal that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce 
Clause by enacting the Drug-Free School Zones Act. 
                                I. 
     Appellant sold approximately 1080 grams of cocaine to a Drug 
Enforcement informant within seven hundred feet of the James 
Howell Public Elementary School in Philadelphia.  A federal grand 
jury returned a three count indictment charging appellant with 
separate violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 845(a) and 843(b).  
Orozco pleaded guilty to the charge under § 841(a)(1), but 
disputed the location of the drug sale and the charge under § 
845(a).  Appellant then requested new counsel.  L. Felipe 
Restrepo, Esq. was appointed to represent the Appellant.  Orozco 
requested a bench trial on Count Two of the indictment. 
     Both the Government and the defense stipulated to the facts 
of the underlying distribution charge of Count One, which was 
also the subject of Count Two.  The sole issue before the 
district court was the location of the drug transactions.  The 
district court found Orozco guilty of selling drugs within one 
thousand feet of a school and sentenced him to sixty months 
incarceration and eight years of supervised release.  Orozco 
timely appealed. 
     Orozco's trial counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1398 (1967).  Counsel 
asserted that there were no non-frivolous issues for appeal and 
requested leave to withdraw.  Appellant, acting pro se, filed a 
carefully crafted brief in which he questioned whether, in light 
of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, --- 
U.S. ---, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the district court had imposed 
a legal sentence.  We granted trial counsel's request to withdraw 
from the case.  We agreed, however, that Orozco's pro se brief 
had raised an issue for this appeal and appointed new appellate 
counsel to examine the implications of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Lopez. 
                               II. 
     Orozco argues that 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) is an unconstitutional 
exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.  He relies 
on the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez to support his argument.  
We are not persuaded. 
     The Constitution gives Congress power to "regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several states and with the 
Indian Tribes."  U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  In Lopez, the 
Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).  This Act prohibited 
possession of a firearm within one-thousand feet of a school.  A 
five-member majority of the Court struck down the statute as an 
unconstitutional exercise of Congress' commerce power.  Lopez, 
115 S.Ct. at 1630-34.  The Court reviewed the three areas in 
which Congress could exercise its commerce power and not run 
afoul of the Constitution.  First, Congress "may regulate the use 
of the channels of interstate commerce." Id. at 1629.  Second, 
Congress may "regulate and protect instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate commence 
even though the threat may only come from intrastate activities."  
Id.  Third, Congress may "regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce."  Id. (citations 
omitted).  The Court held that Congress could enact the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act only if the Act regulated an activity which 
substantially affected interstate commerce.  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 
1630.  In determining that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was 
unconstitutional, the Court held that the Act 
          [i]s a criminal statute that has nothing to do with 
          "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
          broadly one might define those terms.  Section 922(q) 
          is not an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme 
          that could be undercut unless the intrastate activity 
          were regulated.  It cannot, therefore, be sustained 
          under our cases upholding regulation of activities that 
          arise out of or are connected with a commercial 
          transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, 
          substantially affects interstate commerce. 
     Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.  The Court reasoned that "the 
possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an 
economic activity that might . . . substantially affect 
interstate commerce."  Id. at 1634. 
     We have no difficulty here in finding that the sale of 1080 
grams of cocaine within one thousand feed of a school zone is an 
activity which "substantially affects interstate commerce."  In 
so holding, we recognize that the Drug-Free School Zones Act 
directly regulates commerce in illegal drugs.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Zorilla et al., 93 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Drug Free 
School Zones Act" directly regulates interstate commerce."). 
     A large interstate market exists for illegal drugs. Congress 
has the power to regulate that market just as it has the power to 
regulate food and drugs in general.  See, e.g., Minor v. United 
States, 396 U.S. 87, 98, n.13, 90 S.Ct. 284, 289, n.13 (1969); 
Reina v. United States 364 U.S. 507, 511, 81 S. Ct. 260, 263, 
(1960).   Moreover, when Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (of which 21 U.S.C. § 
860 is a part), Congress expressly found that drug trafficking 
affected interstate commerce.  See 21 U.S.C. § 801; Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-513, 
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat.)4566, 4595-96.  
     We do not find Lopez helpful to appellant.  The Gun-Free 
School Zones Act and the Drug-Free School Zones Act are 
distinguishable.  18 U.S.C. § 922(q) punished mere possession of 
a firearm near a school.  In contrast, 21 U.S.C. § 860 prohibits 
the sale, distribution and possession with intent to distribute 
illegal drugs near a school.  Drug trafficking is an inherently 
commercial activity; the mere possession of a firearm is not.  
Drug trafficking near a school zone is an economic activity that, 
through repetition, substantially affects interstate commerce. 
See United States v. Thortnon, 901 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1991) 
("it would be illogical to believe that [drug] trafficking ceases 
to affect commerce when carried out within 1000 feet of a 
school").                         
                                I                III. 
     In sum, we find that 21 U.S.C. § 860 is a constitutional 
exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.  
The decision of the district court will be affirmed. 
